Happy Orange Day!
Officially today has been declared "Freedom Day" by Yushchenko, to celebrate the beginning of the Orange Revolution. On November 21, 2004, the second round of the Ukrainian election was held, and on November 22, when it became clear than Yanukovych and pals had stolen it, people started taking to the streets.
The Orange Revolution was certainly successful in that the fraudulent result was overturned, and in the rerun the guy who should have won Round 2 finally got his win.
However, a number of my Ukrainian friends have been depressed recently about Yushchenko firing Tymoshenko, the "Memorandum of Understanding" with Yanukovych, the rising cost of everything (having to do with Ukraine's current economic difficulties), and the recent poll figures suggesting that Regions of Ukraine might get enough votes to put Yanukovych in as newly-empowered Prime Minister in March 2006. "What did we (and a third of the nation) have the Orange Revolution for?" they ask.
This is what.
Things to Celebrate on Orange Day
- Democratic Choice: As I will say a million times if I have to - throughout the Orange Revolution, precedent was more important than President. The results on November 22 were very straightforward, Yushchenko had won more of the votes, and the results had been falsified. There had been numerous violations of election law on polling day against Yushchenko, during a process even more suspect than the October vote. Ukrainians had been cheated.
Maybe Yanukovych and the Party of Regions will win big in March. He did get 44% of the electoral vote in round three of the presidential election, so somebody was voting for him. But if his party does win in March, it will be based on votes, not administrative influence. In contrast, the SDPU(o) is hated by the people; it won't be able to win anyway.
This doesn't mean that Ukrainians will necessarily have pleasant choices to make when elections roll around, but they can trust that they live in a democracy, and the results will reflect their vote. If Yanukovych had won based on fraud, then their democratic powers would have been strongly curtailed.
- Actual Freedom of Speech: There are no more temnyky. You hear again and again, but I want to remind us what it was like before all these changes.
According to the OSCE: in the period they covered, about 43% of news was covered in such a similar manner across numerous sources that they believed those sources could only have been given the same guidelines to follow. This was verified by reporters standing up on Independence Square to renounce the temnyky guidelines they had been following. All major media sources were pro-government, with the exception of Channel 5, which had been shut down, or threatened with being shut down, three times over the course of the year. When they were shut down in October, the month of the first round of the election, they went on hunger strike to protest and gain enough attention to get put back on. They only made it back on the air just before the election.
My favorite fact from the OSCE, though, is its breakdown of the coverage on UT1, Ukraine's public television station, the equivalent of PBS or the BBC. That station gave 64% of its political and election prime time coverage to Yanukovych, and portrayed him positively or neutral 99% of the time. Yushchenko got 21% of its time, and 46% positive or neutral coverage. Some regional sources were even worse, with Zaporizhzhya state TV giving Yanu 100% of its coverage, and 100% either positive or neutral.
Now you have news stations that hate Yushchenko and Tymoshenko, ones that love them, and ones that are more measured in their attitudes; there are stations all over the map.
- Reduced Corruption: The Tymoshenko and Yushchenko people have slung accusations of corruption against one another, and invoked the Orange Revolution in the process. The government still can't carry out a high-profile court case in a respectable manner. And Poroshenko isn't out yet, despite voter opinion. The situation is still loads better than in 2004.
The rules and regulations governing entrepreneurial ventures have been drastically simplified. Tax dodging has shrunk considerably. The corrupt traffic police are gone. And when voters protested against poor regional officials, those officials generally didn't keep their jobs. Even Poroshenko has been demoted in the NSNU party (thanks for the link, LEvko!). He may not be out, but he's down.
Modest progress? Of course, very modest. But compare: Under Kuchma in 1998, Lazarenko was Prime Minister despite being the most hated man in the nation. He stole millions from the economy using his position during the negotiation of oil deals with Russia to do it. How has Poroshenko thusfar been able to use his position for personal advantage? Possibly something, but nobody really knows, and he's out of the government.
Kuchma gave away Krivoryzhstal to his son-in-law. The windfall money from the resale may not all go to voters, but it will certainly be better for the nation than the original sale. Kuchma was a president who based his government in corruption. Yanukovych was his successor, and gave no indication he would change that behavior until he lost the election. Now the way he's trying to get back into politics is by claiming he will fight the corruption in the current administration.
Corruption is on the agenda in a way in never was under Kuchma, and would not have been without the Orange Revolution.
These three items have lead to another benefit Ukrainians will get from the Orange Revolution.
A Parliamentary Election Based on Parties and Platforms
In 1994 there were dozens of possible parties to choose from, most of which appeared just before the election. In 1998, same problem, in 2002, same problem. Just before each election, a new group of deputies would come up with a new name for themselves and go to voters, who would have no idea what their underlying ideology would be. Were they liberal? conservative? free-market? state-control?
No one would be able to tell a thing about them, except, perhaps, for the sadly short-lived "Beer Lovers' Party". But in this Parliamentary election Ukrainians can count on access to a wider range of media sources, providing better information on candidates, with parties competing for their votes whose voting record they can see. And when they vote, they can be much more sure that it will be their votes that determine the winners.
That's worth celebrating.
For my part in the celebration, here's that old Yanukovych Egg Incident video. (6mb avi)
[Taras Kuzio has a list of accomplishments in the Eurasia Daily Monitor (problem areas coming tomorrow). I referenced his when making mine.]
Dan McMinn
in 32) Nov 2004 Pres. Election, 35) Orange Revolution, 01) Economics and Finance, 07) Political History, 03) Foreign Policy - Western Europe, 10) The Cabinet, 05) Foreign Policy - US, 31) Mar 2006 Parl. Election, 09) The Media, 20) Privatization
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I hope that serious action and education take place at all levels for the AIDS threat.
http://www.medicalnewstoday.com/medicalnews.php?newsid=33647&nfid=rssfeeds
Arguably the best pieceI have read this week was at http://www.mosnews.com/commentary/2005/11/22/russiaukraine.shtml
Here it is:
Freedom Day for Ukraine and Russia
22.11.2005
Stanislav Belkovski Vedomosti.ru
Ukraine’s Orange Revolution has discredited itself over the past year — this seems to be common knowledge in and around the Kremlin. The Ukrainians must envy the solid stability of President Putin.
Indeed, Ukraine today lacks much of what is the Kremlin takes pride in. Things like huge supplies of oil and natural gas. Like the power vertical — a multi-level system of bribes accumulation and distribution. Like the Public Chamber. Like the Council on National Projects Realization.
President Yushchenko
However Ukraine has something that Russia today does not and could not possibly have. Like freedom of speech. On any TV channel, in any newspaper any politician or just anyone can criticize the authorities as harshly as he chooses. And nobody from the Presidential Service would start calling the editorial office, hysterically demanding to “stop the provocation”.
The post-revolutionary Ukraine also has real political competition. The opposition’s parties — Viktor Yanukovich’s the Regions Party and Yulia Tymoshenko’s Batkivshina today top the public opinion polls, and for some reason nobody expects the existing authorities to cancel their registration, ban them access to the media and arrest their sponsors.
In Ukraine a very high ranked official can be fired if suspected of corruption or professional inefficiency — something that never happens in Russia. On September, 8 president Viktor Yushchenko, who the Kremlin thinks is weak and useless, sacked Yulia Tymoshenko’s government, two of his closest aides and several more businessmen-ministers who received their positions as a gratitude for help in the revolution.
Ukraine has other achievements. In February 2005 this poor, energy dependent country set the newborn child benefit at 8,000 hryvnas, or $1,600. In Russia, rich and oil-wealthy, the newborn child benefit is 8,000 rubles, or $285.
On October 24 Ukraine signed the first honest and effective privatization deal to be signed in a post-Soviet country: 92 percent of Krivorozhstal shares were sold to an Indian investor for $4.8 billion. In June 2004 — only 16 months before that — the “wise” pro-Kremlin Viktor Yanukovich government managed to receive only $800 million, six times less, for the same asset. It is worth mentioning that the transparent Krivorozhstal privatization almost coincided with the not so transparent Sibneft nationalization. Sibneft, that the government sold in 1995 for $100 million, was bought back from Roman Abramovich’s offshores for $13.1 billion. I can see the Kremlin’s point when it prohibited its representatives to comment on the Krivorozhstal tender.
The Krivirizhstal story has proved that Ukraine is finally starting to separate power from property. Former proprietors, classical post-Soviet oligarchs Rinat Akhmetov and Viktor Pinchuk did their best to wreck the tender. They even got a statement from the Rada — Ukrainian Parliament. But the tender did take place and Lakshmi Mittal, that paid the market price for the asset, will only be a proprietor — it’s definitely not going to take over Ukraine, place its people in Parliament and appoint its loyal men ministers.
Viktor Yushchenko has also managed to stabilize Ukraine’s position in the world. The fact that the U.S. Senate is canceling the Jackson-Vinnick amendment exactly one year after the revolution speaks for itself. In the past year Ukraine has secured the niche of the leading post-Soviet country — the niche that seemed to have always belonged to Russia.
Of course the new authorities have made their mistakes. One of them was the arrest of the opposition’s Boris Kolesnikov and Yevgeny Kyshnarev. But both politicians were freed long ago and are now getting ready for the parliamentary elections, not for moving to the uranium mines.
I have all the reasons to say — Yushchenko, criticized by everybody, full of drawbacks, the man who literally lost his face — this man did for Ukraine too much of what Vladimir Putin promised to do for Russia, but never managed to. All that is left for the Kremlin now is to tell tales of the miserable Ukraine that is sinking rapidly.
The Stable Chaos
Another fairytale the Kremlin spin doctors tell us is that Ukraine is on the verge of sinking in the chaos of confrontation between its Eastern and Western parts. Indeed there are serious cultural contradictions between Ukraine’s East and West. Moreover, both the parts are complicated in their own structure too. Different researchers count up to ten so-called political and mental clusters in Ikraine: Kiev, Galichina, Don region, the Crimea etc.
Ukraine only started to exist within its current borders as a separate state in 1991. Bits of several ruined empires were hard to put together. In the beginning of 1990s Ukraine was facing a serious risk of disintegration.
These times are gone. Ukraine is still far from a politically united nation, and the leading political forces still tend to represent the will of separate regions and not the society in general. It was this way at the 2004 elections, it’s going to be this way in 2006 too. Regions fight for the all-Ukrainian power, the president’s post and right to form the government — but they are not struggling to get separated from the country.
Russia’s fate looks much more pessimistic in this respect. Under the virtually-cleptocratic power vertical, two instability factors are gaining power: the Caucasian terrorism and the Chinese expansion in the Far East. These two processes are a real threat to the unity and integrity of our state. However the subjects of these processes do not sit in Parliament and do not have any legal status at all, noreover, they don’t seem to need it.
So in the stability rating I would rank Ukraine more stable than Russia.
25 Kinds of Non-Freedom
Russia’s political elite is sensitive about what’s happening in Ukraine, not just because it bet on the wrong horse at the 2004 elections and lost. Also because the Orange Revolution and what followed it brought out the serious differences between the Russian and Ukrainian elites.
Putin is the smallest evil — this is what Putin’s stability apologists keep saying recently. What they mean is this: we have always dreamed of having 25 kinds of sausage in our shops, a round-the-clock bar in the National Hotel and trips abroad. Freedom, democracy, national interests — we only brought those in for better PR. So let us bless the authorities that give us 25 kinds of sausage and trips abroad, and let us forget about Russia’s future!
Ukraine’s political and intellectual elite consists of all kinds of people — liberals and socialists, Russian- and Ukrainian-speaking, those who fancy unity with Russia and pro-Western activists. But there are two things uniting these people. The first is — Ukraine’s statehood is a priority. The second thing is the question: what have you done for Ukraine? These two things were behind the orange Revolution. It wasn’t organized as the paranoid Kremlin says, by American spies. It was organized by people who desired freedom in their own independent state.
Ukraine is the mirror that shows Russia’s post-Soviet elite’s own swollen, distorted, both scared and cunning ugly face. This is why we are so jealous of Ukraine. This is why those who choose 25 kinds of slavery as their life goal feel so bad about November, 22. The freedom day.
This site also provides access to some revealing interviews, particulary with Lutsenko and Tymoshenko, [as well as the creepy Kivalov].
Medvedchuk is being interviewed tonight.
Sure some changes are there but will they last??
I appreciate your input, though.
Here's my latest:
http://averko.blogspot.com (November 27, 2005)
YANUKOVYCH'S RESURGENCE SHOULD COME AS NO SURPRISE
By Michael Averko
Not too long ago, it was fashionable to write off Donetsk based Ukrainian political leader Viktor Yanukovych as an also ran whose time had come and gone. What many overlooked was the topsy-turvy political landscape of post Soviet Ukraine, where otherwise dubious (as seen by some) figures resurface as acceptable leaders.
...
After 2000, Kuchma's legacy of corruption is discovered by some leading American policy groups and one time Kuchma ally Yushchenko is targeted as a desired presidential replacement (in the months leading up to the Ukrainian presidential elections, Yushchenko became a client of Madeleine Albright's Democratic Party funded political consulting group). During his tenure as prime minister under Kuchma - Yushchenko openly supported the fire sale of Ukrainian assets abroad at a time when the Ukrainian economy was faltering.
On the other hand, Yanukovych's prime ministerial reign saw Ukrainian economic growth and a protectionist economic policy of not seeking to quickly sell off business interests to foreign subsidiaries. Upon his bid to become Ukrainian president, Yanukovych's strong points were overlooked and the reasons appear quite obvious.
...
Whatever doubts on the final election result, several points remain clear. Yanukovych received over 40% of the vote and his power base in the influential Donbas region is nothing to take lightly. On the other side, Yushchenko surrounded himself with some dubious oligarchs in Petro Porsohenko and Yulia Tymoshenko, to go along with a wily group of Galician centered nationalists.
Out of all of this, Yanukovych has emerged as an influential force in Ukrainian politics. The upcoming Rada elections make for great analysis in the field of punditry on the former Soviet Union.
For their own respective reasons, Washington and Moscow have good reason to be disappointed at the way events have occurred in Ukraine. Look for the White House and Kremlin to avoid getting too involved in future Ukrainian political matters. Try as some have throughout the centuries, anti-Russian forces aren't likely to ever succeed in separating the historic relationship firmly bonding much of Ukraine with Russia. Some faulty Russian policies towards Ukraine and vice versa contradict the natural fraternal interests between Kiev and Moscow. From the Western mindset, it will hopefully be understood that Ukrainian overtures to the West shouldn't be undergone in the spirit of some grand anti-Russian geo-strategic board game (anti-Russian sentiment in Ukraine is at best restricted to a 1/3 minority in the western region of that country). Like their Ukrainian brethren, Russians welcome closer ties to the West.
gives a list of overseas organizations and numbers of observers who had been officially registered to oversee the 2004 Ukrainian Presidential elections.
The OSCE had 1549 observers; European Parliament 89; Parliamentary Assembly Council of Europe 79; and so on. All together 9260 foreign observers are listed, amongst which 4, yes 4, were from the British Helsinki Group for Human Rights [to whose report on the OR Michael attaches some weight]. Are they just a name-plate shell outfit I wonder? Michael suggests that the OSCE, PACE, and European Parliament observers, whose members were from several dozen different states and of many political hues, were biassed. Is he implying a conspiracy?
The overwhelming evidence is that the first two rounds of the 2004 Presidential Elections in Ukraine were rigged.
Clearly Yanukovych was, and is popular in densely populated Eastern Ukraine, which broadly speaking, has a different 'Weltanschauung' to the rest of the country. But to many Ukrainians he is seen as a criminal recidivist - an oafish and thuggish enforcer who together with gangster oligarchs and clans divided up between themselves the country's most valuable assets in fixed privatization schemes with Kuchma's approval. Moreover, at the beginning of the millenium their modus operandi and grip on the country was spreading westward.
Yushchenko and Tymoshenko have also attracted their fair share of shady businessmen who enriched themselves under Kuchma's 'krysha'. As long as candidates for the Parliamentary Elections are chosen and placed on party lists by a small band of party bosses, and not by rank and file members, and as long as Parliamentary deputies are automatically granted immunity from criminal prosecution once elected it's seems clear that crooks with the fattest wallets will strive to be on the lists of whatever party with a chance of being elected.
The Mount Olympus of Ukrainian politics has been dominated by the same old names for quite a few years now, and the country may drifting towards becoming a plutocracy - a state controlled [perhaps in turns] by its richest members. The OR showed that whilst Ukrainian electors will probably accept this with misgivings, they will not accept downright electoral fraud.
I recommend guilt-tripping the oligarchs so that they'll abide by the rules and allow for more changes will happen and they'll be more likely to emulate the partial-altruism of many wealthy USAmericans.
dlw
http://www.jamestown.org/edm/article.php?article_id=2370529
I am hoping to get the Minnesota Baptist Conference to sponsor the translation into Russian of two chapters of the famous African American Christian Community Development activist John M Perkin's book, "<a href="http://product.ebay.com/A-Quiet-Revolution_ISBN_0876807937_W0QQfvcsZ1388QQsoprZ4540209">A Quiet Revolution</a>", The first chapter explains how they learned about the need to minister to both spiritual and physical needs of the people in their community. The second chapter deals with principles for grass root organizing that fosters community development through leadership development, rather than economic transfers.
I'd be very interested in seeing how the chapters would be received in the former soviet union. The writing of John Perkins is becoming more popular in Mexico and the Latin Americas.
dlw
That doesn't sound impossible or like as if the shortcomings of this past year were inevitable or what-not.
dlw
http://tap-the-talent.blogspot.com
Discover a voice that may resonate with yours.
Michael: I've cut out all the parts of the article not having to do with Yanukovych. It is the same stuff of yours I've left elsewhere on the site and anyone interested can find it on your blog.
Yushchenko became National Bank governor at a crappy economic time. At that time the country had already begun to nosedive into hyperinflation and economic collapse. The whole government was printing money like mad and depositing all their own assets elsewhere, primarily Cyprus. After three or four years of fighting, he managed to stabilize Ukraine's currency in the midst of this chaos, something he was often praised for by financial institutions and analysts like those at the IMF.
Later, when Yushchenko was Prime Minister, the most visible government changes were coming from Tymoshenko's crackdown on corruption in the oil industry. (she had once been on the other side, working underr PM Lazarenko) Privatization was still sketchy, but not nearly as much so as under Lazarenko, and it beat the complete absence of anything under the aptly-named Pustovoitenko.
In constrast:
What was economically helpful about Yanukovych's time in office wasn't intentional, and what was intentional wasn't helpful. His time saw the crony capitalism theft of Kyivoryzhstal. (I did mention it in this entry) It saw high global steel prices over which he had no control. The only thing he might have assisted in was keeping Russia happy so they maintained the gas prices to Ukraine at artificially low levels. (the topic of today's entry, coincidentally)
His "protectionism" against privatization as you refer to it consisted of: not doing a damn thing about privatization for two years except ok-ing the aforementioned Kuchma family deal. Privatization is good if done well, and speed is a secondary concern. Yanukovych did not do well.
So basically all you have is that Tymoshenko scared some investors while PM, and Yanukovych had the good fortune to be taking orders from Kuchma at a time when the economy was improving despite the corruption.
Meanwhile the rest of us have moved on: Ukraine now has Market Economy status from the EU, with luck it will be off the Jackson-Vanik list soon, and the government is trying to decide what to do with the six times greater returns on this Krivoryzhstal sale, and planning to privatize Nikopol and Ukrtelecom.
It is true that Yanukovych has not disappeared, as Zerkalo Nedeli put it so well:
"The result of the split between Yushchenko and Tymoshenko (according to the law of preserving political energy) has been a rise in the approval rating of Viktor Yanukovych and the Party of Regions."
He's managed to rebrand himself as an opposition leader fighting against corruption. I didn't think he'd be able to do it. We'll see if it lasts to the election.
"Natural fraternal relations between Moscow and Kyiv"
What on earth are you talking about? The Soviet government in Russia was hostile to all manifestations of Ukrainian nationality - the language (they banned), the history (they rewrote), and the culture (they smeared). Since the fall of the Soviet Union, the Russian government tried to tell Ukrainians who to vote for in 2004, they played up their charges against Tymoshenko when they thought it might be helpful, they have maintained a "special deal" with Kyiv on energy that they can then threaten to eliminate any time Kyiv does something they don't like. (like they did at the beginning of this year, and like I'm hoping they'll finally follow through on by the end of the year) These are just an insignificant percentage of all the things Ukraine and Russia are at odds over.
Meanwhile, the people say in polls that they'd be happy to rejoin with Ukraine so long as Ukraine didn't have a chance of being in charge. They want a controllable little brother still, as they have since the "Malo-Russkie" slur first got coined.
Ukrainians have lots of relatives in Russia, and vice versa. But no governments have "fraternal relationships".
The Ukrainian Soviet utilized the Ukrainian language. Moreover, the Soviets attempted to linguistically Ukrainianize the Russian language Donbas region in the late 19 twenties. This attempt perhaps explains why Surzhyk is common place in contemporary Ukraine.
The idea of "Ukrainian" goes back 150 years. Kievan Rus wasnt' called Kievan Uke.
Yes, no governments are fraternal with one another. This includes the US and Britain and the US and Israel.
Here's a thought provoking article for you as cited from http://www.rusjournal.com, a site that's no more/no less legitimate than Fallwell, Robertson, Farrakhan and the Chechen separatist Kavkaz site (even so called "extremists" can have valid points):
http://www.rusjournal.com/antiukraine.html
You should really read Subtelniy. He wrote a great history of Ukraine.
The 150 years thing is more Russian appropriation of history. Ukraine has a better claim to the legacy of Kyiv Rus' than Russia for many reasons including 1) geography, 2) language (Ukrainian is a closer linguistic descendent than Russian), 3) dynastic descent (meaning the descendents of the people in charge were Ukrainian rulers, not Russian ones.
I want to get back to the geography point, though because it's extremely big. Your point, and that of all people trying to claim Kievan Rus' as a Russian, rather than Ukrainian, predecessor, first has to ignore the extant Muscovy presence at the time of Kiev Rus'. That's not too hard, Muscovy was an outlands at the time.
But next, what you need to do is assume that the people who made up the Kyiv Rus' (the term was merely the word describing the government) all picked up shop and moved to what was, at the time, the boondocks of Muscovite Russia. Like a national government and people just all of a sudden disappear from one place, and reappear in another.
It's ludicrous. Russia was a poorly developed outlands in the time of Kyiv Rus'. It's rise to international power was considerable, but that didn't give them the right to attempt to steal Ukraine's more attractive history during the Soviet Union.
Ukrainian couldn't be spoken in government, in schools, or in places of business during the Soviet period. The 1920's efforts were merely a ploy to try to entire Ukrainians in, and all pretense of supporting the language was dropped during the Stalinist period.
Subsequent efforts, on the rare occasions when they occurred, were mere sops to try and appease the nation at unrestful times.
The Ukrainian Soviet conversed in Ukrainian. That's a clear fact as was the attempt on the part of the Communists to linguistically Ukrainianize the Russian speaking Donbas region in the late 19 twenties. The Communists created a Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, which had a seat at the UN unlike the RSFSR.
Yes, I did read Orest Subtelny's History of Ukraine. I respectfully suggest that I do a much better job than yourself when it comes to fully understanding the given divergent views on the involved subject matter.
The Riurik dynastic line which ruled ancient Russia had moved the capital north from Kiev when the Trident was still the coat of arms thru the reign of Ivan the Terrible. Michael Romanov a distant relation of the Riuriks was elected as czar by a panel of boyars.
As a Russcoentric person, I feel that I have a greater right of historical and cultural claim to Kiev than those taking an anti-Russian Ukrainian Uniate position from Galicia. Their ancestors weren't Uniate but "pure" (if you may) Orthodox Christian. The west Ukrainian dialect has noticeable Polish and German influences. Through foreign subjugation, the anti-Russian/west Ukrainian nationalist position was separated from the Kievan Rus legacy for centuries and as a result developed different linguistic, religious, architectural and geo-political differences. I know more than enough well educated Jews, Russians and Ukrainians from that part of the world who agree with me.
Your lingusitic claim on who speaks the more pure language of Kievan Rus (modern day Russian or the "canon" Ukrainian; the latter being differentiated from Surzhyk and the west Ukrainian dialect) is very much open to debate.
Additional thanks to everyone who leaves comments; it wouldn't be the same without you.
You've all got me to thinking, and I think I've formulated a (somewhat) coherent statement of some of my views on the matter.
1.) The Ukrainian language is important. There's a lot of cultural heritage in there that should be valued by Russians and Ukrainians alike.
The aforementioned piece on rusjournal mentions that byliny are found up around Moscow, not around Kiev, and uses this to promote Moscow as the cultural successor of Rus. I'd like to add a thought I picked up from one I. Yushchuk in the preface to his handbook on the Ukrainian language: Bylinas and other relics of ancient Russian culture have Christianity stamped all over them, whereas examination of Ukrainian folk songs reveals them to be teeming with allusions to pre-Christian paganism.
The argument is that the Russians are all descendants of the Ugro-Finnic tribes who had Rusian culture foisted upon them when they were conquered in the early Christian era. Laying aside any questions of "legitimacy" (which I'd be happy to see discounted as meaningless anyway) I'd be happy to see the Ukrainian language stick around and gain popularity.
2.) That being said, I'm kind of sickened every time I hear the words "рідна мова" ("native language") appropriated to mean "Ukrainian", even for people who can't speak a lick of it, and certainly didn't grow up speaking it.
A question to the Anti-Russian-izers: If Ukrainian culture being separate from Russian culture makes it so much better (I've seen this argument several times, though not here) why does your favorite movie date from the Soviet era? (That goes for the Russians, too. What happened to good movies, guys?)
3.) While Ukrainians and Russians do have a lot of common cultural heritage, and it's a shame to see them at odds, I do think that it occaisionally becomes necessary in the course of human events for people to dissolve the political bonds which have connected them with others. (Is my cultural bias showing?)
While democracy in its current form may not be the final answer to all political questions, I submit that it is one of the best tools available today, and propose that it be promoted in Ukraine, as well as in other places. The trouble is that close political and economic ties with Russia at this time could be detrimental to the promotion of democracy.
My understanding of the situation in Russia is that Putin is strengthening the "power vertical" in an attempt to restore coherence and unity that were lost under Yeltsin. While I concede that Russia has a legitimate need for such coherence, I wish it didn't come at the expense of things like freedom of the press.
I think Lukashenko (ironically) said it best in today's RFE/RL newsline (I quote:)
----
President Lukashenka told journalists in Beijing on 6 December that the Community of Democratic Choice, which was formally set up in Kyiv last week, has no "prospects" or "future," Belapan reported. . . . "Why to come up against the East and go to the West? . . . What will they bring to the West? Criminality, brigandage, banditry? . . . Europe does not want that."
----
The West doesn't want criminality, brigandage, or banditry, but the East seems to have demonstrated that it doesn't mind them in the least. Ukraine is stepping away from Russia, but I think it's a step in the right direction. I'd love to see them on good terms, but I hope that when they do get back together it will be on "this side of the fence". Unfortunately, I have no plan for the details of how increased democracy in Ukraine could help build democracy in Russia. I'm open to suggestions, though.
By and large, Ukrainians and Russians get along just fine. An extreme minority that's most prevalent from elements within the Galician region go gainst that. Even then, it's not like a Serb verus Croat scenario.
Anti-Russian Ukrainian nationalists babble about "Mongol" influenced Russians as if to say that Ukraine wasn't under Mongol rule. Likewise, some Russians and Russocentric Ukrainians refer to Ukrainians as Polonized Russians.
I had an experience with one west Ukrainian nationalist who referred to me as a self hating Ukrainian. She based this on the "ko" ending of my last name. In Ukraine, you can find people with a name like Ivan Popov refer to themselves as Ukrainian, while others having a name like Taras Kindrachuk refer to themselves as Russian.
I understand why western Ukraine is different from eastern and southern Ukraine with central Ukraine being somewhere in between, but having more in common with the eastern and southern regions.
Western Ukraine wasn't always Russia unfriendly. There's plenty of documentation showing how it was very pro-Russian for much of the 18 hundreds. Russian troops were warmly received as they crossed Galicia en route to Hungary in 1848. During the Russian Civil War, the Galician Ukrainians arguably got along better with the Russian Whites than with Petlura.
Russian media is arguably freer than the Enlgish language mass media variant. In Russia, one can find plenty of media criticism of Putin, with much of it being unfair. For more, refer to the media section at http://english.intelligent.ru. Plenty of well founded analysis suppporting this view.
As Russia and Ukraine are very much interrealted, I introduce this site which posted a 12/6/05 article of mine entitled ON BEING RUSSIAN at http://www.russiablog.org. One of the editors of that site (Yuri Mamchur) has a family background from western Ukraine. He and I seem to be in basic agreement.
Here's another one for you written by someone with a "chenko" ending last name:
UKRAINE AS RUSSIA
http://www.untimely-thoughts.com/index.html?art=1152
Politically, Ukraine is certainly not less corrupt than Russia. Furthermore, Putin has a 70% popularityy rating in Russia as opposed to Yushechnko's much lower popularity rating in Ukraine.
Uke from Canada: Thanks for the support. In truth, I have also reigned in my expectations for the site so long as I'm in the US. My connection to events is, like you say, much weaker while I'm in the US.
But in the expectation that I will eventually settle down in Ukraine in a few years, I'm maintaining the site, hoping just to keep it up until I can go back and provide more first-hand coverage.
I'm still not sure I'll be able to, but I will continue to post weekly so long as there is hope.
As for the topics themselves, though, I would argue that the correct path is still the correct path, no matter how distant the commentator. I do know what effect, (for example, from the most recent entry), increases in the oil price will have on poor older people unable to pay their heating bills.
It's still the right thing, just like distancing the judiciary and giving it some teeth, greater transparency, diversification of industry, further deregulation and all that.
DLW: Uhh... I agree with your prescription without agreeing with your explanation. I would argue: imprison the real bastard oligarchs, then let the others off if they invest in more altruistic endeavors.
But plutocracy and democracy are certainly exclusive. Either you get into office based on wealth or on a vote. Yes, you need lots of money to raise your visibility generally, but when you dig down to the basic reason why someone is in office, it must be one or the other. Either the Rockefellers ruled the US or the Executive-Legislative-Judicial. Rich people wield disproportionate power, yes, but in a plutocracy that is not a problem with the system, it is the system itself. There is a big difference.
Ransom: Thanks for the support. Easiest question first: "Why is your favorite film from the Soviet days?" Because, in the words of a good friend of my, Shweta "It takes a little money to afford culture."
As for the "right" relationship between Ukraine and Russia, I'm up for most anything possible to create in a transparent, democratic, and self-interested (on both sides) way. The reason the last point gets on there is that if it is not explicitly self-interested by one side or the other, I will mistrust that side.
I'm also quite happy with angry and unhappy political arrangements because I don't think governments need to be happy to work. Political conflict between Ukraine and Russia doesn't seem particularly problematic to me, so long as it doesn't escalate to something scary. I defend the Ukrainian side of the debate because it's the country I care about.
That about covers it.
Michael: Damn, you almost had me agreeing with you because of Kyiv Rus. You've read Subtelny and a bunch of Russian historians on the Kyiv Rus' period, so I will concede that you have more grounding in that time period than I. You made a good argument, and linguistic descent of the Kyiv Rus is a debatable issue.
So I concede that I don't have enough grounding to debate the old history with you.
But do you really expect to get away with saying that western Ukraine was "divided off by foreign subjugation" as if the East wasn't divided off in the same way. Yes Ukrainians in the West liked Russia in the 1800's. They were being oppressed by the Poles, whereas it was the Eastern Ukrainians who were oppressed by Russia and so hated them more.
The prominent government positions were given in that time to Russian-speaking elites. Ukrainian was suppressed. When the Soviets took over, they mobilized the Russian workers in the cities (enticed into the areas under the Czars to work places like Donetsk. Not surprisingly, the scattered Ukrainian speakers in villages were easy to subjugate by pre-centralized Russian cityfolk. Again, Ukrainians and Ukrainian were suppressed.
Are you SURE you read Subtelny? And yet you somehow don't know that during the Soviets writers who wrote in Ukrainian were sent to the gulag for it (e.g. Bograni), the language was outlawed, Ukrainian-language schools were shut down.
On a personal note, my wife's parents took her to the registry office hoping to give her the good Ukrainain name Olesya. They were told NO SUCH NAME EXISTS, and ended up naming her with the Russian version, Alesya, though they use the real name at home.
This is to completely ignore the suppression of religion based in Ukraine or abroad in favor of the Moscow-controlled Orthodox Church.
If you cannot even admit the overwhelming evidence showing the hostility of the Soviet government to the Ukrainian language (from the petty to the murderously hateful) then I certainly can't trust any of your other historical opinions, including your "Rus moved to Kyiv" argument.
Possibly to drive home your partisanship, you say this:
"Russian media is arguably freer than the Enlgish language mass media variant."
This is one of the dumbest things I've heard. That you make it all is evidence that argument will be futile. I therefore don't even no where to go from here.
dlw: I guess I tend to be pessimistic about that sort of thing.
Dan:But plutocracy and democracy are certainly exclusive. Either you get into office based on wealth or on a vote. Yes, you need lots of money to raise your visibility generally, but when you dig down to the basic reason why someone is in office, it must be one or the other.
No, I don't they're mutually exclusive, but the degree of influence from $peech can be mitigated. Most effective anti-corruption reformers play political jujitsu and pick their battles carefully.
Dan:Either the Rockefellers ruled the US or the Executive-Legislative-Judicial. Rich people wield disproportionate power, yes, but in a plutocracy that is not a problem with the system, it is the system itself. There is a big difference.
dlw:last sentence did not make much sense...
I'd love to hear if the movie Syriana makes a showing in Ukraine and how it is received.
dlw