Officially today has been declared "Freedom Day" by Yushchenko, to celebrate the beginning of the Orange Revolution. On November 21, 2004, the second round of the Ukrainian election was held, and on November 22, when it became clear than Yanukovych and pals had stolen it, people started taking to the streets.

The Orange Revolution was certainly successful in that the fraudulent result was overturned, and in the rerun the guy who should have won Round 2 finally got his win.

However, a number of my Ukrainian friends have been depressed recently about Yushchenko firing Tymoshenko, the "Memorandum of Understanding" with Yanukovych, the rising cost of everything (having to do with Ukraine's current economic difficulties), and the recent poll figures suggesting that Regions of Ukraine might get enough votes to put Yanukovych in as newly-empowered Prime Minister in March 2006. "What did we (and a third of the nation) have the Orange Revolution for?" they ask.

This is what.

Things to Celebrate on Orange Day

1. Democratic Choice: As I will say a million times if I have to - throughout the Orange Revolution, precedent was more important than President. The results on November 22 were very straightforward, Yushchenko had won more of the votes, and the results had been falsified. There had been numerous violations of election law on polling day against Yushchenko, during a process even more suspect than the October vote. Ukrainians had been cheated.
   
   Maybe Yanukovych and the Party of Regions will win big in March. He did get 44% of the electoral vote in round three of the presidential election, so somebody was voting for him. But if his party does win in March, it will be based on votes, not administrative influence. In contrast, the SDPU(o) is hated by the people; it won't be able to win anyway.
   
   This doesn't mean that Ukrainians will necessarily have pleasant choices to make when elections roll around, but they can trust that they live in a democracy, and the results will reflect their vote. If Yanukovych had won based on fraud, then their democratic powers would have been strongly curtailed.
   
   
2. Actual Freedom of Speech: There are no more temnyky. You hear again and again, but I want to remind us what it was like before all these changes.
   
   According to the OSCE: in the period they covered, about 43% of news was covered in such a similar manner across numerous sources that they believed those sources could only have been given the same guidelines to follow. This was verified by reporters standing up on Independence Square to renounce the temnyky guidelines they had been following. All major media sources were pro-government, with the exception of Channel 5, which had been shut down, or threatened with being shut down, three times over the course of the year. When they were shut down in October, the month of the first round of the election, they went on hunger strike to protest and gain enough attention to get put back on. They only made it back on the air just before the election.
   
   My favorite fact from the OSCE, though, is its breakdown of the coverage on UT1, Ukraine's public television station, the equivalent of PBS or the BBC. That station gave 64% of its political and election prime time coverage to Yanukovych, and portrayed him positively or neutral 99% of the time. Yushchenko got 21% of its time, and 46% positive or neutral coverage. Some regional sources were even worse, with Zaporizhzhya state TV giving Yanu 100% of its coverage, and 100% either positive or neutral.
   
   Now you have news stations that hate Yushchenko and Tymoshenko, ones that love them, and ones that are more measured in their attitudes; there are stations all over the map.
   
   
3. Reduced Corruption: The Tymoshenko and Yushchenko people have slung accusations of corruption against one another, and invoked the Orange Revolution in the process. The government still can't carry out a high-profile court case in a respectable manner. And Poroshenko isn't out yet, despite voter opinion. The situation is still loads better than in 2004.
   
   The rules and regulations governing entrepreneurial ventures have been drastically simplified. Tax dodging has shrunk considerably. The corrupt traffic police are gone. And when voters protested against poor regional officials, those officials generally didn't keep their jobs. Even Poroshenko has been demoted in the NSNU party (thanks for the link, LEvko!). He may not be out, but he's down.
   
   Modest progress? Of course, very modest. But compare: Under Kuchma in 1998, Lazarenko was Prime Minister despite being the most hated man in the nation. He stole millions from the economy using his position during the negotiation of oil deals with Russia to do it. How has Poroshenko thusfar been able to use his position for personal advantage? Possibly something, but nobody really knows, and he's out of the government.
   
   Kuchma gave away Krivoryzhstal to his son-in-law. The windfall money from the resale may not all go to voters, but it will certainly be better for the nation than the original sale. Kuchma was a president who based his government in corruption. Yanukovych was his successor, and gave no indication he would change that behavior until he lost the election. Now the way he's trying to get back into politics is by claiming he will fight the corruption in the current administration.
   
   Corruption is on the agenda in a way in never was under Kuchma, and would not have been without the Orange Revolution.

These three items have lead to another benefit Ukrainians will get from the Orange Revolution.

A Parliamentary Election Based on Parties and Platforms

In 1994 there were dozens of possible parties to choose from, most of which appeared just before the election. In 1998, same problem, in 2002, same problem. Just before each election, a new group of deputies would come up with a new name for themselves and go to voters, who would have no idea what their underlying ideology would be. Were they liberal? conservative? free-market? state-control?

No one would be able to tell a thing about them, except, perhaps, for the sadly short-lived "Beer Lovers' Party". But in this Parliamentary election Ukrainians can count on access to a wider range of media sources, providing better information on candidates, with parties competing for their votes whose voting record they can see. And when they vote, they can be much more sure that it will be their votes that determine the winners.

That's worth celebrating.

For my part in the celebration, here's that old Yanukovych Egg Incident video. (6mb avi)

[Taras Kuzio has a list of accomplishments in the Eurasia Daily Monitor (problem areas coming tomorrow). I referenced his when making mine.]

I'm starting to think the Nasha Ukrayina people, and Yushchenko, are unable to succeed at anything for the same reason than you can't win at chess when you're playing against yourself.

Like LEvko said in a recent comment: It's horrifying and fascinating to watch just how many own goals they can score.

A Short List of Top Flops

• Taking Advice (and what else?) from Boris Berezovsky: Ok, so one of Russia's premiere scoundrels Boris Berezovsky, has said he was a major donor to the Yushchenko campaign, retracted the statement - said he was lending 'ideological support', retracted his retraction, and now he wants accounting for the money he says he contributed (most important snippets here, I thank poster Michael Averko for the link, if not for the absurd claim that OR was also bought by the man).
  
  Mr. Berezovsky's statements raise a lot of questions, not the least being: How can a man without morals lend moral support? And what did he actually contribute, and why did the Yushchenko people take anything from him?
  
  
• Cherishing Berezovsky's Advice: Even worse than consulting with Berezovsky, now from Roman Bezsmertniy:
  

  As if blissfully unaware of [how ties to Berezovsky deeply compromise the party in the view of Ukrainians], Deputy Prime Minister Roman Bezsmertny, who has been appointed the NSNU campaign manager, told ICTV on November 13 that he would like to consult with Berezovsky on election strategy. "The experience of our three-year-long cooperation [with Berezovsky] has changed a lot in my views on public campaigns and on politics in general," Bezsmertny confessed.
  

  What does Nasha Ukrayina keep this guy around for? Yushchenko had to fire him last year because he was an incompetent campaign manager, and then after the OR, he made out in interviews as if the Nasha Ukrayina people had been planning the Orange Revolution during his time as manager. Now Nasha Ukrayina has made him campaign manager again, despite knowing he has failed utterly to do so before. The only thing he has going for him is that he's too incompetent to be corrupt.
  
  I'm also curious what good political advice an exiled businessman loathed by his nation could have. (don't do this, don't do that, definitely don't do that...) If even he knows enough to teach Bezsmertniy something, I think it's a pretty good timeto fire the man.
  
  
• No Self-Policing Ability: The NSNU conference was marred not just by Bezsmertniy's comment, according to the Eurasia Daily Monitor. Some of the less prominent members tried to oust the greatest liabilities from the party (Poroshenko and other big tycoons) but failed. So now they get to remain the party of "marginally less bad" businessmen.
  
  In defending himself, Poroshenko pointed to the fact that (despite being loathed by voters) none of the accusations against him, made by Yulia and her allies, has yet to hold up in court. Which is true, but meaningless, considering the justified lack of public trust in the judiciary. They couldn't prosecute a politician standing over his enemy's body with a blood-covered knife in his hand. (and occasionally giving him extra stabs) Which brings us to the next item:
  
  
• Medvedko is the New Prosecutor - Expect Little: Well Pyskun is gone as prosecutor. Thank goodness. Few choices would be have been worse than keeping him, and one of those is taking a dark-horse bid for the prosecutor's office by former President Kuchma.
  
  But he's not going to get anything done, either. As the Kyiv Post has fumed about, he think's the Gongadze case is going along alright. This despite the fact that the European Court of Human Rights just fined Ukraine an (uncontested) 100,000 Euro for doing jack-squat for five years about the case.
  
  More on Medvedko's questionable background is in LEvko's excellent posting.

A really messy bit of business, which is a shame. They just scored a great victory over the forces of retrenchment and stagnation with the Krivoryzhstal privatization. You'd think that would have gotten them moving in the right direction a little more than this.

Well, I'm back from my stint as a tour guide today. My buddy Keith went on in his journeys and Lesya and I collapsed.

It was great fun, and we were happy to have him out, but I've gotten extremely behind with all of you.

So now I'm back and going through the Zerkalo Nedeli backfiles looking for material to put into an article on Ukraine. I will hopefully submit the article to Atlantic Monthly (no guts no glory) within a week.

In my searches I've come across some articles I'd like to share with you all:

1. I've been spending a lot of my time trying to figure out why exactly Kuchma fired Yushchenko. I have the common supposition - that he was irritated that Yushchenko was more interested in reform than loyalty - and have been looking for any information on Kuchma's motives, either supporting this view or providing a more compelling one. This article gives Zerkalo's reason for why Kuchma fired him.
2. At about the same time Tymoshenko was thrown in prison. This event has often been described as formative for her. This article was an interview with her on her politics during her incarceration, and this article follows up by asking her about the conditions in which she was detained. (which she repeatedly said did not count as torture)
3. There are remarkable similarities between the tactics used against the opposition in the run-up to the 2004 election and in the run up to the 2002 parliamentary election. This article describes media suppression and electoral games in Donetsk. This article describes the use of anti-American rhetoric to scare voters. This heartfelt article describes how the journalist's own father was persuaded to vote against Yushchenko by Russian media trying to link him to extreme nationalists. This article gives a summary of the media situation in the immediate aftermath of the election.
4. I've also been trying to track voter preference throughout the past years, to determine the extent to which the Orange Revolution was the culmination of a process. Zerkalo analyzes Razumkov data periodically: in spring of 2001, in September of 2001, again in November 2001, just before the spring 2002 parliamentary elections, in July 2002, in March of 2003, in June of 2003, in April of 2004, and in August of 2004. (among others)

In recent hectic days I've just been trying to keep up with current events as they happen and add a modicrum of commentary before passing them on to you. However, now it looks like we'll have a bit of a slow period until Yushchenko's 13 Jan inauguration, so I thought I'd try to do some more analysis.

One thing that struck me during the marathon political debate Lesya and I had with our friends on New Year's was this: lack of media transparency in government does not necessarily mean less political punditry, it just means less informed political punditry.

Among the things we tried to piece apart were questions like:

1. Why didn't Kuchma use Russian troops so many people (including Omelchenko) are sure he brought into Kyiv to deal with the protesters? Why didn't he use violent repression?
2. Why did Kuchma pick Yanukovych and not a more palatable candidate? (which Discoshaman and I have talked about before, and he provides a possible reason for here)
3. Who really killed Kirpa, and why? Same goes for
4. What is likely to happen in the upcoming months? What kind of odds is Yushchenko working against, and what might he accomplish?

There were other questions, but those were a few of the major ones. The thing that we kept coming back to was that there wasn't much information on Kirpa. On 30 Dec, Prosecutor General Piskun said "as things have developed so far, all of this looks most like suicide"(in Russian at Glavred). But then, when the news broke on the day after his death, reports indicated that he'd died from multiple gunshot wounds, putting him among the most determined suicides. (Go to Zerkalo Nedeli of you want even more reasons to question the look of suicide.)

So as with many events, we logically reject the official verdict and are then left to speculate about who actually killed him. At one point, we paged to a particularly eerie picture from the Kyiv Post, showing Kuchma, Medvedchuk, and Yanukovych standing by over the coffin at Kirpa's funeral. Kuchma is staring off in the middle distance, Yanukovych also, and Medvedchuk just stands there with a frown so pronounced it seems almost comic. These were the kinds of subjective trifles we were working from.

There were plenty of plausible killers and motives, the sheer range of potential suspects would make this a great mystery. But the important thing is that since we had so little trust in Piskun and the Prosecutor General's Office, we had no extra facts to work with. It would be like trying to solve the murder knowing only the material from chapter one.

Of course we could not. The same went for Yushchenko's poisoning: could have been Kuchma or one of his, could have been Yanukovych or one of his, could have been Russia. We didn't have enough facts to get even an educated guess.

This is the greatest loss to a country from lack of transparency in government complicated by widespread conflicts of interest is the sense of being able to find anything definite. We had trouble enough ascribing motives and determining causes for these major events despite intensive reporting. More minor events were often even less readable. Start with major business interests controlling much of the media and working in the government and when something, anything, happens in the country, everyone starts speculating in overdrive. They feel free to reject contrasting news reports for the often logical reason that they may contain totally skewing the information.

What you get is a countrywide assumption of guilt concerning all actors in any event. This, in turn, leads to major problems considering that most illegal actions will include one right and one wrong person, irrespective of their right or wrongness in other circumstances. The alternative to blanket pessimism is the often teeth-grinding commitment to only work from established facts, which can be had only from a few organizations infrequently. It would also require that an individual, for example, seriously consider the possibility tht Kirpa killed himself under these very suspicious circumstances, on the word of a highly questionable Prosecutor General .

No surprise then that most everyone slips into creaky conjecture sometimes. The sense of it is like estimating the distance between the roofs of two adjacent buildings, then attempting to bridge the two with a long line of two-by-fours nailed end to end. It is a constant difficulty in Eastern European politics which I find no parallel for in Western politics.

It is also a cause for much mutual misunderstanding. I would have trouble explaining to people how much more straightforward it is to analyze American politics when there is so much journalistic observation you have a guy like Bob Woodward tagging around after presidence like a terrier. It is probably the reason for one of the most amusing occurences I remember from being an election observer.

I sat through a couple OSCE training sessions on how the Ukrainian election was set up, and from them created the following rule: During the question and answer period, if the observer asking the question was from a Scandinavian country, the question would be an insightful one about a small but vital process-related detail. The answer would almost invariably be that the Ukrainian law was not specific about that detail, and the poor Scandinavian observer would sit down, mind boggling at the potential for misunderstanding or misapplication of the rules.

Eventually the election came off, and the OSCE repeatedly congratulated many polling stations for coming up with good quick-fix solutions when problems occured. People were able to muddle through, but the whole progress of the thing included enough waiting until the last minute and then dealing with crises on the spot to make even the calmest Western observers a little edgy at times.

That's all events in Ukraine. It's also why natives so often shrug in answer to major questions.

Great crop of English articles from Zerkalo Nedeli this Monday.

First is "Perpetual Vote", which is probably the best analysis of the political opportunities and threats ahead of Yushchenko in the upcoming year that I have read, including Taras Kuzio's stuff.

Second is "Mahatma Yushchenko and Russia", which is a riff on why Yushchenko's  reconciliation overtures to Russia are good. (the overtures being just part of what I like to call Yushchenko's bid for "Classiest Man on Earth", along with his stern resolve not to bicker about the fact that administration supporters tried to kill him)

Third is "The Presidential Administration Consultation", is an interview with the witness who provided the Supreme Court with the "irrefutable evidence" that the Yanukovcyh's team rigged the election.

There's also an article on the Constitutional Court decision, but that decision was made on Saturday morning, so it's mostly just a refresher on what the case involved.

 

Third Round a Significant Improvement

So here are the OSCE findings for the election.

The OSCE says this round of the election "brought Ukraine substantially closer to meeting international standards". The OSCE sent the most observers to Ukraine in its history: 1,370. My congratulations and warmest thanks go out to all those folks who skipped Christmas to promote democracy.

Lots of Europeans, from PACE and the European Parliament and the OSCE, congratulated Ukraine on much improvement. They gave most of the credit to citizens for standing up for their rights. Talk was about "building blocks" and progress and whatnot.

The overall mood was upbeat, and the report positive. The problems the OSCE found were smaller in scale than last time.

The OSCE was bothered by inflammatory material. (while Yanukovych's campaign-manager, Chornovil, complained most vociferously about Yushchenko partisan symbols in polling stations, the OSCE mentioned mostly things like pamphlets handed out at Yanukovych rallies that linked Yushchenko to Nazism)

Understandably, the OSCE also saw problems with voting from home, after an election amendment article limiting voting to only the most extremely handicapped was declared unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court the day before. They say Ukrainians did a good job trying to come up with makeshift solutions. (they always do, in my experience)

If you are a really concerned individual, you can read the full OSCE report here.

My thoughts on the document are:

• It is astounding how half a million Polling Station Committee members were collected in less than a month. This wasn't just a matter of bringing back old members, because the representation in round 2 was for the original 24 candidates from round 1. The amendments meant the committees would be composed of representatives of only two candidates. More Ukrainian resilience in tough circumstances.
• A big round of applause for the new CEC members. They worked really hard and came out with initial results with remarkable speed. I was able to analyze the Election situation today, and if I had been awake, probably could have gotten a representative analysis done by 6am this morning.
• The range of views in the media was much more diverse, leading the OSCE to believe the "temnyky" booklets were no more. (Temnyky "dark booklets" were periodically released instructions from the administration telling journalists how and what to report) While the talk of "temnyky" is always speculative, I think it is accurate here. This is because I suspect finding reports guided by temnyky is like finding plagarized papers in a classroom. It's hard to describe how to find such a document without a specific example in front of you, but if you know what you're doing, it's not that hard to figure out which are the legitimate documents and which not.
• The OSCE comes right out and says opposition-friendly Channel 5 is "biased" towards Yushchenko. While I love the station for its feistiness (I lost track of how many times the administration tried to shut them down during the fall campaign), I think the OSCE is right. They are a great station, but that doesn't mean they're always even-handed.

packed with nutritious facts

So here are some observations and analysis of the CEC numbers at: http://www.cvk.gov.ua/wp0011e (sometimes this link doesn't seem to work, in which case go to http://www.cvk.gov.ua/ then click on the "Вибори Президента України 2004" link and on the British flag in the upper right corner of the screen.

So with 98.95% of the votes in, the results are as follows:

Yushchenko: 52.21%     Yanukovych: 44.00%     Against All: 2.34%

I am a little surprised that the difference between candidates is less than 10%, when I compare them to the 10-20% spread on the exit polls. This could theoretically be due to Yushchenko supporters being more happy to tell a bunch of pollsters how they voted. (many of the polls being conducted by eager looking younger folks who might intimidate older Yanukovych voters into thinking they might be punished for answering against Yushchenko) The difference could also reflect some of the continuing election fixing activities that went on, though the opposition said it was much less pronounced in this round. I trust the CEC this time around, because the opposition trusts it this time around.

The Yanukovych Voter Spike

Unfortunately, as the CEC uses frames, I have to give you directions to pages rather than a link. It's still worth it.

The most useful and info-rich graphic is unfortunately only in Ukrainian. Go to "Вибори Президента України 2004", the main page. On the left-hand menu bar, click Порівняння голосування 31.10.2004, 21.11.2004, 26.12.2004. It's the only option in the menu bar that includes numbers.

You will see a graphic with three bar charts for all of Ukraine, followed by charts for each region (corresponding to rounds 1, 2, and 3. To the right of that are columns for Yushchenko votes, Yanukovych votes, total votes accounted for, the percentage of voters who voted, and arrows indicating whether the number of participating voters rose or fell between rounds.

If you can read some Cyrrilic, you will be able to see that without exception, voter participation in pro-Yanukovych areas spiked by around 9% between rounds 1 and 2, then fell, often by as much as 5%, between 2 and 3. Without exception, Yushchenko voting changed by no more than 3% between any two rounds, even after all of the events on Maidan.

Donetsk and Luhansk are, of course, the starkest examples.

Turnout          Donetsk                   Luhansk

Round 1          78.08%                   75.60%
Round 2          96.64%                   89.49%
Round 3          84.20%                   84.27%

For comparison, here are the most pro-Yushchenko areas:

Turnout          Ternopil                     L'viv

Round 1          84.91%                    80.80%
Round 2          86.63%                    83.46%
Round 3          88.81%                    85.29%

 

When those trying to cast doubt on the opposition victory tell you: "So a 92% pro-Yanukovych vote in Luhansk is obviously fraud, but an 93% pro-Yushchenko vote in Ternopil is not? Such hypocricy!" You can say, "It sure is, when 15% more of those pro-Yanukovych people appear for round two!" You can then go on to point out the taped conversations (part 1 and part 2) of Yanukovych's staff as they carried out the fraud, and also the massive number of observer-recorded abuses in the East matched by none, or almost none in the West.

It's the big day! Voters have gone out to the polls today starting at 8am.

I will be reporting on events from the Yushchenko campaign headquarters starting at about 13:00.

The schedule at the headquarters is: (got it from www.ua.org.ua)

11:00AM -- Victor Yushchenko casts his vote at the polling station No.1 (Maidan Nezalezhnosti)

12:00PM -- The opening of the Election Day Press Center. "Good luck and happiness!" -- pre-Christmas greetings from folklore music groups.

12:30PM -- Press conference by Mykola Tomenko, MP, Victor Yushchenko's representative on the topic "The place and the role of mass media during and after the presidential elections in Ukraine."

01:15PM -- Live telephone conferences by Victor Yushchenko's regional heads in the Eastern regions.

01:30PM -- Press conference by Mykola Katerynchuk, MP, Victor Yushchenko's representative on the topic "The legal aspects of the election campaign and the day of elections."

02:30PM -- Briefing by Pavlo Kachur, MP, on the topic "Voting process throughout Ukraine."

03:20PM -- The anthem of the orange revolution "We are many and we are unconquerable," performed by "Hrynjoly" band.

03:30PM -- Film "Orange Revolution."

04:00PM -- Press conference by the deputy head of the Yushchenko Central HQ of the "Power of the People" coalition and superintendent of the public resistance movement Roman Bezsmertniy, MP, on the topic "Orange Revolution -- Maidan -- New Ukraine."

05:00PM -- Presentation of the new video clip "Maizha Vesna" ("Almost Spring") by Svyatoslav Vakarchuk and the "Okean Elzy" band.

05:30PM -- Press conference by the co-chairperson of the "Power of the People" coalition Yulia Tymoshenko, MP.

06:30PM -- Briefing by the artistic director of the "Art-velece" Taras Hrymalyuk, the leader of the "VV" band Oleh Skrypka, and the leader of the "Tartak" band Oleksandr Polozhynskiy on the topic "The music and the revolution." Presentation of the "We are together!" music disk.

07:00PM -- Performance by "Tartak" music band.

07:30PM -- "Musicians against separatism" presentation by bands "Armada" (Donetsk), Lesya Herasymchuk and "Korolivski Zaitsi" band (Lviv).

09:00PM -- Press conference by the head of Victor Yushchenko's election campaign Oleksandr Zinchenko on the topic "The first results of the election."

10:00PM -- Press conference by the head of UUIE Anatoliy Kinakh.

11:00PM -- Christmas Vertep.

12:00AM -- New-Year election blockbuster "Veseli yaitsya v shampanskomu" ("Merry eggs in champagne").

01:00-02:00AM -- Address by Victor Yushchenko.

The results of the parallel vote count and of the CEC will be announced and assessed on becoming available.

A couple weeks ago, (specifically on 7 Dec) Former Libertarian Presidential Candidate and current Representative Ron Paul (R. - Texas) gave a speech to Congress entitled "US Hypocrisy in Ukraine". Unfortunately, I only became aware of it a few days ago, but better to rebut late than never rebut at all.

In his speech Paul alleged that "We do not know exactly how many millions -- or tens of millions -- of dollars the United States government spent on the presidential election in Ukraine," but, "much of that money was targeted to assist one particular candidate...Viktor Yushchenko."

The rest of his speech was built from the following elements: scare statements such as "we know how many other efforts, overt or covert, have been made to support one candidate over the other in Ukraine," the twice mentioned implication that his findings are just the "tip of the iceberg" with many more dastardly manipulations undiscovered, and a grand total of three solid facts implicating US-funded groups for pro-opposition partisanship.

One of the facts is that the Western Ukraine Regional Training Center hung an orange ribbon on their website. I looked, I can't find this elusive ribbon, they must have taken it down since Paul's speech. The second fact is website favoritism by the Center for Political and Legal Reforms, which genuinely seems to favor Yushchenko.

But the centerpiece of his speech is the International Center for Policy Studies, which he has caught for having Yushchenko on the Board of Advisors. Here he'd caught American money used in clear partisan fashion.

Oh, wait, just a moment. Look who else is on the board: Yuri Yekhanurov, Deputy in Victor Yushchenko's Our Ukraine Bloc; Oleksandr Chaly Ex-First Deputy Minister for European Integration who is rumored to have ticked off Kuchma for pro-oppositionist leanings, Advisor to the President of Ukraine Anatoli Halchynsky, Advisor to the President of Ukraine Anatoli Maksiuta, and Deputy Stanislav Dovhy from the Pro-Presidential For a United Ukraine Bloc. (I have included the remaining 15 board members at the bottom of this article, so you can check them as well)

By my count there are three opposition-leaning deputies and three government-leaning deputies. That is what most of us call BI-partisanship. I might expect a Libertarian to have trouble with that concept, but even Paul should have been able to read the titles "Advisor to the President of Ukraine" written next to two of the names, when he was able to read Yushchenko's own name.

But what if this is just the tip of the iceberg? We'll never know how many facts Paul sifted through to find the "damning" evidence he needed to dress up his crude isolationism as a moral judgement.

Ultimately he reveals his distain for Ukrainians when he says if they "feel the vote was not fair" they should figure out how to deal with it themselves. Ukrainians didn't feel anything, they knew for a fact it was stolen. They knew because many international observers helped a group of active NGOs that braved repeated government crackdowns (and sometimes interrogations, beatings and imprisonment) to record the facts and publicize them. Assisting those NGOs by telling the truth is the obvious moral responsibility of any country which believes in promoting democracy.

There are other, better, arguments than Paul's, his is just an extreme example and thus easier to see for what it is. One of those better arguments is this AP article from 11 Dec.

While this article has some solid points, it is also extremely flawed. When the author says the US is "helping to underwrite exit polls indicating [Yushchenko] won last month's disputed runoff election" he is basically trying to insinuate that the US bought the results it wanted while still allowing himself deniability. If he had facts to back up his claim, he would have said the US bought it outright.

In truth, the widely-quoted exit poll the US contributed to was not a bought poll, and was in no way comparable to the Russian government's bought polls. While the author trumpets the US contribution to this poll, he is too honest to completely ignore the fact that Great Britain, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Canada, Norway, Sweden, and Denmark also contributed money to it and accepted its findings. Like the Kyiv Post said in its excellent opinion piece discussion of this article on the 16th: nobody is whining about Danish interference in Ukraine, everything is attributed to the US. The accusers attempt to isolate the US voice from what is actually a harmonious chorus of Western countries. (Discoshaman also rebutted this kind of talk on the same date; for a really great discussion of this issue, I recommend the recent Christian Science Monitor article on it)

If Western governments, with the US prominent among them, have spent money through organizations like PAUCI, Freedom House, and Democratic Initiatives in an attempt to promote things like voter's rights, public action, a free press, they have had the right intentions. If they have acted so uprightly that people like Rep. Paul must resort to outrageous distortions to undermine them, then God Bless America and God Bless Europe, for they have had the right intentions and acted on them righteously. Such clearly moral policy has rarely been seen since the Marshall Plan.

[Update: before ending, I'm going to promote a couple excellent articles from the great comments I received on this posting. Thanks bunches to Hello, who clued me in to all these great links.

1) http://www.americanprogress.org/site/pp.asp?c=biJRJ8OVF&b=275035 - a reposting of a good Washington Post article on US democracy promotion.

2) http://www.telegraph.co.uk / opinion/ main.jhtml;sessionid= GMIQE4BUNQ0DRQFIQMGSNAGAVCBQWJVC?xml= / opinion/2004 /12/26/ do2601.xml&sSheet=/portal/2004/12/26/ixportal.html - another good Ann Applebaum article, this time about Russian attitudes towards Ukraine.

3) http://www.onthemedia.org/transcripts/transcripts_120304_revolution.html - a political activist from Otpor, Serbia's equivalent of Pora. He helped work with the Pora people and here does an amazing job of fielding some really hostile questioning.]

 

Other Advisory Board members at the International Center for Policy Studies:

The following individuals hold government posts, most of them Presidential appointments, but I do not have a clear evidence that they are partisan one way or the other: (please let me know if  you have evidence to the contrary)
Serhii Romaniuk Deputy Minister of Economy and European Integration
Vitali Melnychuk Deputy Head of the Accounting Chamber
Yevhen Bersheda Ambassador at Large, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Ihor Shumylo Chief of Economic Policy Administration at the National Bank

The remaining board members appear to be apolitical, as far as I can see: (again, please let me know if you have evidence to the contrary)
Jim Bown Chairman, British Ukrainian Chamber of Commerce
Inna Bogoslovska President, Prudens Consulting Group,
President, Viche Ukrainy Foundation
Jaroslaw Kinach Consultant, specialist in Private Business
Svitlana Oharkova General Director, "Techno Ukraine"
Stewart Paperin Executive Vice-President, Open Society Institute
Lev Partskhaladze Chairman of the Board, Investment company "XXI Century"
Alex Sundakov Executive Director, Castalia Ltd.
John Tedstrom President, Transatlantic Partners Against AIDS
Dusan Vujovic Country Manager for Ukraine Europe and Central Asia (ECA) Region, The World Bank Group
Myron Wasylyk Senior Vice President and Managing Director, PBN

Recently on Inter Kanal, one of the channels considered to be most biased towards the existing authorities in Ukraine, they ran a new feature that I think gets top points for being an interesting idea. Unfortunately, not even having an antenna on our TV, Lesya and I missed this one. However, our friends were good enough to explain.

For this show, a group of Inter journalists went to L'viv and to Donetsk in cars decorated with campaign symbols from the unpopular candidate for that city.

So one car was in L'viv all decked out in Yanukovych blue and white. It stopped in front of a Yushchenko campaign headquarters and waited. Eventually a number of Yushchenko supporters tried to invite them in or change their minds about their candidate. Things progressed rather calmly.

However, when the journalists went into Donetsk with their Yushchenko colors flying, a number of people started throwing rocks at their car. They were hemmed in in a tunnel and told, in no uncertain terms, to take their colors elsewhere, and left the city in a hurry.

In contrast to this display of feeling, it was the Yushchenko people that could muster many hundreds of thousands of its supporters across long distances to fight to overturn the election fraud. "Active Yanukovych supporters" and "paid" are almost exclusively in the same sentence. If a person speaks up for Yanukovych, well and good, but finding people willing to go to marches and demonstrate on behalf of the man is nearly impossible. If this was just a preference for a candidate, one would expect a much greater showing for Yanukovych.

Why is this?

Eastern Ukrainians are not fighting for anything, they are fighting against, and since they are fighting against, they have no flag around which to rally.

This is not a choice between a "western" and "eastern" route. All people in Ukraine know that the country is struggling and, yes, poor in comparison with Western Europe. All of them know that the country is rank with corruption, and this is the reason that Ukraine's potential is being squandered. West and East want the same standards of living, same prosperity. They want almost the same thing Poland wants, for that matter.

Western Ukraine is reaching for this thing that Poland has. They are reaching for greater speed. They are reaching for western standards of living, they are pushing forward to accelerate the country towards growth. They are uniting around the politician they think will clean up the country. They were animated enough by fraud in the election to shut the whole city down. 

Eastern Ukrainians, however, are fighting like people who think they are the rear guard of a retreating army. They are fighting against a system which they don't believe will increase the prosperity of Ukraine, because they believe the fall of Communism was the start of inexorable decline. They fight because progress will render their own part of the nation less and less important unless they can reform their area in a way few of them can imagine. They fear that Yushchenko is more venal, corrupt, and hideously evil than an excellent example of those traits right in front of them. Miners fight to keep their mines open, to hold onto their livelihood, to hold onto their last last scrap of dignity, while at the same time wishing with their whole souls that their children will never become miners.

The people in the east also want clean government and prosperity, they just don't know where to find it.

Yushchenko supporters can put flowers in the shields of police squads and reach out to Yanukovych supporters without violence in the middle of "their" cities. They can do this because they are fighting for a cause. When Alex (a Yanukovych supporter and frequent commenter here) says they speak from emotion it is true. That emotion is hope.

We are staying at our friend's mother's house. She's 60 years old and registered to vote in a small village outside the city. When she went back home she gathered the same stories you hear in every village. In her village of perhaps 50 houses, 3,000 people voted in the last round of the election. The observers for Yanukovych who had been in the village had been from Donetsk, she thought they'd been miners. Two said they'd been paid 1,500 and 2,000 griven to come and be observers.

When these observers got to the village, instead of the resistance they were expecting to find from "insular" L'vivians, they were welcomed just like any village in Ukraine might welcome distinguished guests. (that is to say, with overwhelming, occasionally pushy, generosity) They sat down with the village to a huge feast.

One of the observers, however, didn't eat. Instead he shoved all the food he got into a bag, and told the people there, "I'm going to take every bit of this home to my kids and tell them that the L'vivians are just like us."

Let's hope.

Monday, Monday, Monday. Don't miss the debates. They happen on UT-1 (the government station) at 7pm, Ukrainian time. Again from Obozrevatel, here is the format of the debates. They have been changed up in a way that will hopefully make them more lively than last time.

The debates last time around were a mixed bag. At this site they thought Yushchenko got the advantage. I am not so certain. On the technical front he didn't often look at the camera and of course he looked terrible from the poison. He also spent a lot of time consulting his notes, and he is still a banker, so most of his good hits are coming in from a very high, very technical, angle. In any case it'll be exciting to watch. (more so than last time we hope.)

...than curse the darkness

I recently included a list of really flawed articles on Ukraine on Orange Ukraine. But I also asserted that the cranks producing them are a small minority. Just to give some balance, I'm going to give you a list of my top favorites, which I may add to, as I've forgotten some of the articles I really appreciated that were a little older: (please note that a couple of the folks on this list are from the Guardian. I've really disliked some of the trash they've run in their paper, a couple of articles of which were in my recent "Hey Cranky!" entry. They have good stuff, too.)

 

Great Articles:

National Review, Editorial: Color Us Orange - 6 Nov

Guardian, Timothy Garton Ash: The country called me - 9 Dec

Washington Post, Antonovych: From a Dream to the Streets of Kyiv - 5 Dec

Guardian, James Meek: Divided they stand - 10 Dec

 

Some solid additional articles:

Eurasian Monitor, Kuzio: Poland Plays a Strategic Role in Orange Revolution - 10 Dec

Eurasian Monitor, Kuzio: Pro-Kuchma Camp Continues to Disintegrate - 8 Dec

Washington Post, Holbrooke: From Tent City to Nato - 14 Dec

LA Times, Holley: Opposition in Ukraine Ready to Go Home But Not Let Down Its Guard - 10 Dec

 

And A couple meaty paw slapdowns on cranks:

Washington Post, Ann Appelbaum: The Freedom Haters - 1 Dec

Guardian, Timothy Garton Ash: Bitter lemons - 2 Dec

Ukraine Aims to Get Into the Good Clubs

I recently saw this execrable posting by Charley Reese on LewRockwell.com (as reprinted in the Action Ukraine Report). It was answered in the AUR by this much better posting.

Among its many, many faults, the orignial article by Reese contains the following statement:
"The reason [the kind of government Ukrainians have doesn't concern us] is quite simple: At the end of the Cold War, the Russians withdrew all of their nuclear weapons from Ukraine. Our relations with Russia matter because they concern the question of war or peace; our relations with Ukraine don't matter because there is nothing Ukraine can do for us or to us."

What most surprised me about this posting is how much it resembles the ideas of many Ukrainian armchair generals. I've heard dozens of people tell me that getting rid of its nukes was the worst decision Ukraine ever made, because now no one pays any attention to the country. The real question, then, is whether or not they are right.

A nuclear weapon in modern international relations is like a switchblade knife in a bar. It gets you attention, but not interest, and neatly eliminates all other possible ways of interacting with people. If you bring a weapon, all of the good bars will kick you out, and if you do manage to get into one, you're not going to be doing deals with any legitimate businessmen.

The US, France and China don't need to bring their weapons to any meetings; people want to do business with them. The Netherlands, Canada, and Australia don't need nuclear weapons, are unlikely to ever get nuclear weapons, and still get invited into all the good clubs. Iran is the kind of country looking for the bomb: a country unwilling to advance through economic or democratic progress and looking for a shortcut to getting its way in international relations. This action is not taken by Iranians themselves, but by their government, and will, if carried out, be greatly to the detriment of ordinary Iranians.

By giving up its nuclear weapons, Ukraine committed irrevocably to a strategy of gaining prominence through economic, political, and national progress. If people pay attention to Ukraine now, they do so for its successes or opportunities in business, for its interesting history and natural splendor, and even, surprising us all, for an amazing protest that has furthered their own democratic process and reminded us all how important democracy is. If the rest of the world viewed Ukraine with the bored disinterest Reese obviously does, his statements might have had weight. However, Ukraine is a well-educated nation with lots of potential in many respects. Foreign countries are just beginning to take greater note of Ukraine, but are doing so for reasons much more valuable to ordinary Ukrainians than national threats.

In giving up their nuclear weapons, Ukrainians have chosen the longer, harder path, but this path eventually leads to success, rather than the seedy dives of world society.

The vocal crank minority needs to get its stories straight about Yushchenko

Since many of the major events in Ukraine have already taken place, and we're now waiting expectantly for the election rerun, I've had enough time to sit down and analyze some of the stories that have come out against the opposition in the past weeks and months. Of course this is a much easier task than analyzing pro-opposition press, since the vast majority of press has been positive.

What I found from the small minority of cranks was a collection of accusations against the opposition that not only clash with reality, they class with one another. The most obvious way they clash is in describing opposition presidential candidate Victor Yushchenko. I have posted before, and will probably do so again about how mild-mannered and, well, banker-like Yushchenko is. (He was National Banker for a while) Here are the accusations made against him in a few of the articles:

1) Yushchenko is dangerous because his campaign is tied to radical nationalists.
a. Guardian: Walsh - The Radicals with a vested interest in orange victory (Tymoshenko is the only person in the whole article who is described a a radical, perhaps the author meant the title ironically)
b. Guardian: Steele - Ukraine's postmodern coup d'etat: "The crowds in the street include a large contingent from western Ukraine, which has never felt comfortable with rule from Kiev, let alone from people associated with eastern Ukraine, the home-base of Viktor Yanukovich, the disputed president-elect. [paragraph break] Their traditions are not always pleasant. Some protesters have been chanting nationalistic and secessionist songs from the anti-Semitic years of the Second World War."
c. Guardian: Laughland -- The Revolution is Televised: The West is blind to the real character of the revolution: "The blindness extends even to the posters which the "pro-democracy" group, Pora, has plastered all over Ukraine, depicting a jackboot crushing a beetle, an allegory of what Pora wants to do to its opponents. [paragraph break] Such dehumanization of enemies has well-known antecedents - not least in Nazi-occupied Ukraine itself, when pre-emptive war was waged against the Red Plague emanating from Moscow - yet these posters have passed without comment."

2) Yushchenko is in hock to oligarchs, often used to say Yushchenko is no different than Yanukovych despite Yanukovych's ties to Donetsk oligarchs: as one commentator on this site put it, they are "two sides of the same medal"
a. Guardian: Walsh - The Radicals with a vested interest in orange victory (a discussion about how oligarchs are the ones funding Ukrainian protests)
b. Guardian: Steele - Where the Cold War Never Died "[Political observers] also wonder how much of a democrat Yushchenko is..." [another quote later on in the article]... Like his rival, Yanukovych, he has links to oligarchic clans and served as a prime minister under Kuchma..." (I respond to this article in full here)

3) Yushchenko is a Western Stooge
a. Guardian: Steele - Ukraine's postmodern coup d'etat: "In Ukraine, Yushchenko got the western nod, and floods of money poured in to groups which support him, ranging from the youth organisation, Pora, to various opposition websites. More provocatively, the US and other western embassies paid for exit polls, prompting Russia to do likewise, though apparently to a lesser extent."
b. Mark Almond with the British Helsinki Human Rights Organization (not International Helsinki Federation) : It's now or never for Washington, subheading of the work -- "America's real aim in Ukraine and other former Soviet republics is to seize control of vital resources before China and India can challenge US dominance."
c. Guardian: Steele -- Where the Cold War Never Died -- "But it is mainly because of the Nato factor that the US has become much more engaged in recent weeks in denouncing the dangers of fraud, funding the exit polls which will be done on Sunday and financing the groups of activists who may take to the streets." He seemsto have dropped this argument, seeing as how no one has mentioned NATO here in ages.
d. Times: Jenkins: When is a Mob not a Mob? Refers to Yushchenko as "our oligarch" as opposed to Russia's

last and least:

e. Former Presidential candidate and current crackpot Buchanan: (quotes both Steele and Laughland, rambles on on his own, read him here, if you want)

The problem with these three claims is that each of them assumes a different fundamental character for Yushchenko. If he is a radical populist nationalist, he would be highly unlikely to be simultaneously a Western stooge. If the UNA-UNSO guys were dictating strategy, like many of these people imply, Yushchenko would be virulently anti-western and there would be no possible reason for the US to help him.

If Yushchenko were just like the oligarchs, he would be a disinterested nationalist, because he would be busy pleasing oligarch interests, not those of his country. If he were an oligarch tool, he would also have no particular interest in the West over Russia, because his foreign policy would be pragmatically based on whatever helped the oligarchs the most.

He is none of these things. On the contrary, Ukraine is having a democratic election because he is so damn moderate he was willing to shake hands with the people he believes are behind the assassination attempt against him in September. He is probably the world's only moderate to the death.

Let the cranks keep cranking.

... and in 17 days since the election. So, of course, this next round of the election will need to be free and fair. But inasmuch as the protesters have stopped blocking public buildings, it's stopped being about making people's presence felt through nonviolent confrontation.

As the opposition MP Roman Zvarich said yesterday, "the Orange Revolution has entered a third, and final, stage."

Roman calls it a third stage, I'd call it the morphing of the protest movement back into an opposition campaign movement. Zinchenko is talking about campaign goals again (after the obligatory thanks to the protesters for making it all possible). He talks about getting people into contested areas to give the opposition's side of things, organizing allies, setting a date for a real Yushchenko-Yanukovych debate, even that old faithful last campaign tactic managers pull out when they can't think of anything else - getting more people involved by using the Internet.

This is a lot different than the relatively straightforward goals of the protest: blockade the major buildings, make a lot of noise, if you can get into a building, go in and let the people inside know you're there, and, more than everything else, express your support.

And they did.

For comparison purposes: In Georgia, protesters started gathering in the capital to protest the election fraud shortly after the fraudulent election on the 2nd of November. They got the resignation of Shevardnadze and his crew on the 24th of November. That's three weeks of nonviolent protest. I'm sure a thanks goes out from all Ukrainians in the protests to the Georgians, especially as the Ukrainian protesters were able to celebrate the anniversary of Georgian victory, and take heart, just as their own protest began.

An addition. You know that things are settling down when they're putting a best of the revolution collection of music up on the Internet. Thanks to Obozrevatel for the link. [link doesn't seem to always be working] If you want a fantastic Reuter's slideshow link, it is in the Yahoo news article here.

How it was yesterday:

So can we stop saying Yushchenko "accuses the administration of poisoning him"? In this article in the Times, the reporters talk to the Austrian doctors who worked to heal Yushchenko, and they have finally come out and said he was definitely poisoned.

The new word:

Well a huge thanks to Melissa in the comments here who pointed me to this article. It appears the Austrian doctors' spine transplant encountered complications - rejection by the host.

THE FINAL WORD, FINALLY

Ok, so now they have said he was poisoned. This article from the AP is the final word from the hospital: it was dioxin poisoning. Is anybody surprised, no. Of course Havrysh could be relied upon for a bilous response, with Yanukovych says "coming this close to the election, I'm afraid it's just political technologies."

Of course it was. Just like when Havrysh accused Yushchenko of making the whole thing up. But don't expect contrition from the man.

"The suspicion of poisoning has until now neither been confirmed or excluded," said Korpan [the doctor who the Times quoted yesterday as saying the opposition], according to the Austria Press Agency. He could not be reached for further comment.

"[Clinic Director] Michael Zimpfer said doctors had only 'a descriptive diagnosis' but were still trying to determine what had caused the illness." and then later... "'It could have been natural causes, or it could have been a poison,' Zimpfer said, adding that 'it might also have been a combination of poisons. Everything is in the air.'"

Yeah, everything is in the air including stuff that swells a healthy man up like a plague victim, and leaves him in the state described in this article in the International Herald Tribune.

I repeat what I said in the last article, only more strongly now that they've lost the ability to take a stand even now:

Why is it that when Yushchenko was the one with a morphine drip system in his back to keep him vertical, it was the Viennese doctors who seem to have had the spine problems. Is it coincidence that they decided to come out strongly on this issue after millions of activists won this election for Yushchenko? Meanwhile Yushchenko had to endure accusations that the illness was, among other things,  a complication from a botox injection having to do with his chronic alcoholism? Along with everything else he had to sit by while every newspaper had to say "the opposition 'claims' he was poisoned" or talk about his "mysterious ailment".

Now that they've rescinded, how long is it going to take a state-of-the-art medical clinic to finally reach a conclusion about this ailment? They've had THREE MONTHS, how much longer will they need to find out what caused this?

As always, thanks to the Action Ukraine Report.

Here's another great article by Taras Kuzio. This guy is always worth reading about Ukraine. Good thing there is the Eurasian Daily Monitor to print his words.[if someone has a siteconnect for me on this one, let me know] And of course a hat tip to the Action Ukraine Report for getting this info out where I could find it.

It's not just advantageous that Yushchenko's side enough to release the tapes as it is that the opposition now has loads more compromising material on Yanukovych, the SBU has also decided not to cover up the administration's dirty dealings, to the contrary, they're positively shining a spotlight on them.

YANUKOVYCH-GATE UNFOLDS AFTER UKRAINIAN ELECTIONS
Yet another Ukrainian political scandal over tape-recorded conversations

By Taras Kuzio, Eurasia Daily Monitor
Volume 1, Issue 139, Jamestown Foundation
Washington, D.C., Friday, December 3

The first year of Leonid Kuchma's second term as president of Ukraine was marked by a scandal that eventually became known as Kuchmagate. The affair was triggered by the release of secret tape recordings made in his office by a security guard. Two years later another scandal emerged; "Kolchuga-gate" concerned Kuchma's authorization of the sale of Kolchuga military radar systems to Iraq.

Now Ukraine has Yanukovychgate. This scandal involves a large number of audiotapes related to Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych. These tapes, which are of far better quality than those made by Mykola Melnychenko in 1999-2000, were made by the Security Service (SBU) and leaked to challenger Viktor Yushchenko days after the presidential runoff on November 21.

The Yanukovych camp did attempt to block electronic surveillance of its activities. But their efforts obviously failed. Unlike in the Kuchmagate tapes, such an extensive operation could have only been undertaken by more
than one SBU officer. The SBU has a technical operations department and does control and monitor government communications.

Significantly, the Yanukovych audiotapes were accepted as evidence by the Supreme Court, which is sitting to discuss mass violations in the runoff. Ukrainian courts never accepted the Melnychenko tapes were as
evidence. The SBU tapes will add to the documents intercepted by Yushchenko supporters that the authorities had attempted to smuggle out of the presidential administration building.

The tapes contain hundreds of intercepted telephone conversations from Yanukovych's "shadow election headquarters" between October 30 and November 23, taking in both rounds of the elections. Yanukovych always
had two campaign headquarters. The official face, led by the dapper chairman of the National Bank, Serhiy Tyhipko, played on the positive attributes of Yanukovych's election program, such as his social policies. The "shadow campaign" headquarters had a fundamentally different role a nd was led by Deputy Prime Minister Andrei Klyuev, a close Donetsk ally of Yanukovych.

The shadow office was established to channel funds above the legislated candidate spending limits and to undertake activities that undermined the Yushchenko campaign. The shadow team also coordinated state- administrative resources and the media in favor of Yanukovych and against Yushchenko.

Tyhipko and Yanukovych always presented themselves as conducting a "free and fair" campaign through three strategies. First, they denied that a shadow campaign existed. Second, they insisted that dirty tricks came
from other candidates (i.e. the phony candidates promoted by the authorities). Third, they insisted that both Yushchenko and Yanukovych had allegedly hired Russian political advisors. The Yanukovych camp hired two long-time associates of Russian President Vladimir Putin, Marat Gelman and Gleb Pavlovsky, who run the "Russian Club" in Kyiv.

In reality the Yanukovych campaign had four inter-related units: 1) Tyhipko's official campaign; 2) Kluyev's shadow campaign; 3) "technical" or "fake" candidates; and 4) Russian advisors. Of these four, only Tyhipko's had a "clean" image. The other three components were behind Ukraine's dirtiest election to date. To suggest -- as Tyhipko and Yanukovych are now doing -- that they knew nothing of the other three elements is unbelievable.

The audiotapes provide information as to how voting was conducted and massaged, "who directed this process and how, and why the voting dynamics changed so intricately during the presidential elections in Ukraine" (Zerkalo nedeli, November 27). The tapes also provide insight into how the Yanukovych campaign added upwards of 2 million votes -- and raised turnout by 19% -- in Donetsk oblast between rounds one and two. In comparison, turnout increased by only 3% in Lviv, Yushchenko's base.

Unlike some of the Melnychenko tapes, the voices on these new recordings are clearly identifiable. These figures include Kluyev, Viktor Medvedchuk (head of the presidential administration), Sergei Kivalov (chairman of the
Central Election Commission [CEC]), Sergei Kluyev, "political technologist" Yuriy Levenetz, and long-time Yanukovych adviser Eduard Prutnik.

One of the most interesting sections on the tapes is a conversation about how the official results in round two were to be "massaged." One conversation, early in the evening on election day and three days before the official results were released by the CEC, describes how, "We agreed about 3-3.5% difference to our advantage" (www.maidan.uar.net/audio/). It is unlikely that it is a mere coincidence that the CEC declared Yanukovych victor with a 2.72% lead.

The audiotapes provide concrete evidence of the existence of a "transit server" whose purpose was to manipulate the results as they were sent from local Territorial Election Commissions (TECs) to the CEC. The "transit
server" was based in the presidential administration.

Details of the "transit server" were leaked to the Yushchenko camp and the U.S. Embassy in Kyiv during the first round of the elections, but the authorities always denied its existence. Nevertheless, the long time it took the CEC to receive protocols sent by electronic mail from TECs always seemed suspicious.

The tapes also include conversations by Kluyev, ordering provocations to be undertaken to discredit Yushchenko. In one instance, Kluyev orders an unknown person to "organize some fights or something like this."

The audiotapes, together with other mounting evidence collected by the Yushchenko camp and submitted to the Supreme Court, proves beyond any shadow of a doubt that the authorities never intended to hold a clean
election.

While possessing knowledge of pre-planned election fraud, Kuchma and Yanukovych nevertheless repeatedly "guaranteed" to the United States and EU that Ukraine would hold free and fair elections. This is, therefore, a
major case of deception conducted by Ukraine's leaders that has now backfired and may lead to their own undoing.

 

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This may not count as breaking news anymore, since it was announced at least 5 hours ago, but just to make sure I don't leave anyone out of the loop - the Ukrainian Supreme Court upheld a complaint from a Yushchenko representative, said the second round of the election was a fraud, and called for a re-runoff on the 26th of December.

The biggest part of this win for the opposition, as I see it, is that Runoff II will take place in only a couple weeks. This gives the opposition a chance of maintaining some momentum right up until the runoff.

Ukraine's Supreme Court invalidates runoff result and calls for a revote

After more than 5 hours spent on the concluding discussion alone, the Supreme Court of Ukraine has announced that it considers the presidential election runoff on the 21st of November invalid. In the same decision, the Supreme Court marked the 26th of December as the date of the re-runoff.

The decision partially upheld the demands in the legal complaint made by Mykola Katerynchuk, an official representative of Viktor Yushchenko. Katerynchuk demanded that the Supreme Court acknowledge the winner of the first round of the presidential election (Yushchenko) the President of Ukraine.

Opposition leaders described the Supreme Court's decision with sparkling enthusiasm, often using the word "victory". One of the major figures among Yushchenko supporters, Petro Poroshenko, said that "the decision of the Supreme Court is a victory for democracy in Ukraine." Oleksandr Turchynov, one of the leaders of the "Motherland" party, said the decision is not primarily a victory for the judges but a victory for the MPs and the people who have managed to defend their right to vote.

Appealing to hundreds of thousands of supporters gathered on one of Kyiv's central squares, Yushchenko called the Supreme Court judges "courageous people". While calling the decision a victory and promising a huge celebration on Maidan Nezalezhnosti, Yushchenko warned his supporters not to leave the protests until the Cabinet and Central Election Commission members resign. Both the CEC and Cabinet recently received a vote of non-confidence from the Ukrainian Parliament. According to the country's Constitution, the Cabinet must resign if the Parliament gives it a vote of non-confidence. The Central Election Commission, though not formally controlled by any branch of government, has also received a vote of non-confidence from the Parliament. In addition, the millions of Ukrainians who have participated in daily rallies against the fraudulent election results since they were announced a week ago can also be considered to have cast their weighty vote of non-confidence against the CEC.

Mykola Katerynchuk also called the Supreme Court decision a victory. Katerynchuk expressed the hope that the revote will determine the real winner of the presidential elections and that Ukraine will be able to name its new President before the New Year.

Opposition leaders claim that the Supreme Court decision will force President Kuchma to oust the Cabinet and bring in new Central Electoral Commission members.

Ukrainian Parliamentary Speaker Volodymyr Lytvyn agreed that the Supreme Court decision was a just one.

Several hours after the decision, many world leaders expressed their endorsement of the decision. Georgian President Mykhail Saakashvili said, "this is a historic day not only for Ukraine but for the whole region as well, including Georgia." European and the US officials, as well as Polish President Kwasnjevsky, saluted the court decision. 

Representatives of Yanukovych's camp were not present during the announcement of the results of the court hearings. "We predicted this decision, that's why we didn't go," said Yanukovych's representative, Stepan Gavrysh, calling the court decision "purely political". He expressed skepticism about whether the decision will help to resolve the current political crisis in Ukraine. Gavrysh has also stated that there are many possible situations, among them "Yushchenko's easy victory" and "the hard victory of Yanukovych". He was unable to say whether Yanukovych is ready to revote.

Ivan Kuras, a member of the pro-Yanukovych Regions of Ukraine Party, said he expected Yanukovych would refuse to participate in revote. Many analysts and politicians share the same opinion. Should this happen, Yushchenko would theoretically face his current political ally, Socialist Party leader Oleksandr Moroz, in the revote.

Russian MP Vladimir Zhyrinovskij sharply criticized the decision of the Ukrainian Supreme Court, stating that "in not a single country has there ever been a revote of a runoff." Zhyrinovskyj said he thought Leonid Kuchma, as outgoing President, should have the right to prevent the revote.

Opposition leaders, as well as most opposition supporters, believe that Viktor Yushchenko will win the revote by a wide margin. Some of them, for example Socialist party member Stanislav Nikolaenko, think that Yanukovych should not participate in revote since he will loose. Should he decline to participate, and Oleksandr Moroz and Viktor Yushchenko be the candidates in the runoff, they will be able to come to a compromise, says Nikolaenko.

I've taken bits from a longer article, because Stretovych seems just so thrilled about getting info from the government that he's catologuing everything he's got about government plans including the catering menu. In addition to the comment I italicized, I particularly like the fact that Yanukovych called the secessionist meeting the "Anti-National Sabbath" in public. Perhaps the administration ran out of imagination in coming up with Orwellian names (such as aping the opposition "Power of the People" coalition with a "People in Action!" coaltion") and said, "Aw, crap, might as wall call it like it is."

Volodymyr Stretovych: We have information concerning the government's future actions

At a briefing held at Victor Yushchenko's Election Press Center, Parlimentary Deputy Volodymyr Stretovych, the head of the parliamentary committee on fighting corruption and organized crime, presented journalists with a document that had been delivered to the Yushchenko headquarters by a person that used to work at the Yanukovych headquarters during the presidential elections. He did not give the name of the informant, fearing for the person's safety, but said the SBU will be charged with protecting him.

"We have organized this press conference in order to let our opponents know that we have information about their plans," he said.

The document presented at the briefing was a copy of a fax from Yanukovych headquarters presenting the concept of the "People to Action!" movement. "This fax was sent to their headquarters with a request to organize appropriate actions, because the election campaign of their candidate was not going as well as planned," said Stretovych. According to Stretovych, the person who gave him the document stated that the Russians were involved in developing it.

The document included: plans and agendas for regional council meetings, the creation of a regional "action committees" which Stretovych said were modeled on the opposition "Power of the People" coalition, the holding of mass rallies throughout regions supporting Yanukovych (including "mandatory shows of support by participants of mass rallies for all the decisions made by the regional councils"), and the blocking of state transportation routes. Plans in the document for Yanukovych's "Anti-National Sabbath"  in Severodonetsk on 28 November (a weekend meeting in which leaders from three eastern oblasts stated their intention to secede from Ukraine), were given by Stretovych as evidence that the documents were genuine, since they matched the actual events.

The MP saw the section giving instructions for all regional headquarters to be modeled on the election headquarters on Yanukovych's headquarters as the creation of an "anti-state establishment, focused on dividing Ukraine and created in our own country."

"The apex of hypocrisy," according to Stretovych, "is point seven of the organization section, calling for the organization of public prayers for peace and stability during the mass rallies." [Dan - emphasis here is mine]

 

Here is my first article as Editor/Writer for the International Election Update Newsline. It is on a press-conference held Thursday at 2pm by Yulia Tymoshenko.

 

 

Tymoshenko: The Power Now Belongs to the People

In a 2 December press conference at the Yushchenko press center, opposition second-in-command Yulia Tymoshenko told reporters about the "revolutionary situation" in U